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An Iron Fist or Kid Gloves: American 
Insurance Association v. Garamendi and the 
Fate of the Federal Monopoly on Foreign 
Policy 
J. Matthew Saunders* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Prior to and during the Second World War, the Nazi 
government of Germany engaged in the wide scale theft of 
insurance policies held by Jews throughout Europe.  In American 
Insurance Assín v. Garamendi, the United States Supreme Court 
struck down Californiaís Holocaust Victim Insurance Relief Act 
(HVIRA), a statute aimed at helping Holocaust victims and their 
heirs settle claims against insurance companies by forcing the 
insurance companies to disclose information about policies sold 
in Europe between 1920 and 1945.1  In a five-four decision, the 
Court ruled that the HVIRA conflicted with the federal policy of 
settling the claims through diplomatic channels.2  Justice Souter, 
writing for the majority, stated: 
California seeks to use an iron fist where the President has 
consistently chosen kid gloves.  We have heard powerful 
arguments that the iron fist would work better, and it may be 
that if the matter of compensation were considered in isolation 
from all other issues involving the European allies, the iron fist 
would be the preferable policy.  But our thoughts on the 
efficacy of the one approach versus the other are beside the 
point, since our business is not to judge the wisdom of the 
National Governmentís policy. . . .3 
Almost immediately, representatives of the Jewish community 
called the decision ìtragicî4 and ìa crushing blow to the victims of 
 
* J.D. Candidate, Chapman University School of Law, 2005; M.M.C., The University of South Carolina 
School of Journalism and Mass Communications, 1999; B.A., Vanderbilt University, 1997.  The author 
would like to thank Lara Saunders for her unwavering support and unending patience. 
 1 American Ins. Assín. v. Garamendi, 123 S. Ct. 2374, 2379 (2003). 
 2 Id. at 2390. 
 3 Id. at 2393. 
 4 Charles Lane, Court Rejects Law Aiding Survivors of Holocaust; Calif. Act 
Undercut Presidential Role, Ruling Says, WASH. POST, June 24, 2003, at A11. 
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the Holocaust.î5 
Furthermore, the Courtís decision in Garamendi reaches 
beyond the rights of Holocaust survivors.  It has muddied the 
waters in an increasingly murky area of constitutional lawóthe 
nature of the federal monopoly on foreign policy.  Californiaís 
legislature felt compelled to act because, as stated in the HVIRA, 
ì[a]t least 5,600 documented Holocaust survivors are living in 
California today.  Many of these survivors and their descendents 
have been fighting for over 50 years to persuade insurance 
companies to settle unpaid or wrongfully paid claims.î6  The 
California legislature enacted HVIRA in a legitimate aim to 
eliminate ìthe further victimization of these policyholders and 
their families.î7  The Supreme Courtís striking down of the 
HVIRA throws a glaring spotlight on the problem of determining 
where state authority ends in an increasingly interconnected 
global society.  So far, the Supreme Court has provided little 
guidance to the states or the courts below as to what states can 
and cannot do in the global arena.8 
That the federal government holds a monopoly on foreign 
policy was once a given, but in its application this idea has come 
under fire.  As one commentator has remarked, ì[m]ost everyone 
was comfortable supposing that the national government 
monopolized foreign relations until the Supreme Court actually 
began applying that notion.î9  Garamendi follows more than half 
a century of confusing and contradictory Supreme Court cases 
concerning this federal monopoly on foreign policy.10  It 
represents a retreat from the ideas put forward in these cases, 
but it resolves none of the issues involved.  In fact, in Garamendi, 
the Court fell into many of the same traps as it had in its 
previous jurisprudence, including having to infer what exactly 
the federal foreign policy was and to decide whether Congress or 
the President had ultimate authority over that foreign policy.  
Furthermore, on the ultimate question of whether there is any 
room at all for state action in the foreign policy realm, the Court 
remained silent.  Thus, Garamendi gives little assistance to those 
who hoped it would clarify the role of the states on the global 
 
 5 Henry Weinstein, Holocaust Insurance Law Negated, L.A. TIMES, June 24, 2003, 
at B1. 
 6 CAL. INS. CODE ß 13801(d) (Deering Supp. 2003). 
 7 Id. ß 13801(e). 
 8 Emily Chiang, Think Locally, Act Globally?  Dormant Federal Common Law 
Preemption of State and Local Activities Affecting Foreign Affairs, 53 SYRACUSE L. REV. 
923, 925 (2003). 
 9 Edward T. Swaine, The Undersea World of Foreign Relations Federalism, 2 CHI. J. 
INTíL L. 337, 339 (2001) [hereinafter Swaine, Foreign Relations Federalism]. 
 10 Edward T. Swaine, Negotiating Federalism: State Bargaining and the Dormant 
Treaty Power, 49 DUKE L. J. 1127, 1135 [hereinafter Swaine, Negotiating Federalism]. 
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stage. 
Part II of this Note explores the three prevailing theories in 
support of the federal monopoly on foreign policy: the dormant 
federal foreign affairs power, the dormant Foreign Commerce 
Clause, and direct preemption.11  Part III discusses Garamendi 
and the opinions of both the majority and the dissent.  Part IV 
explores the problems with the Supreme Courtís ruling.  Part V 
posits a solution to the unresolved issues faced in Garamendi, 
which involves recognizing a constitutional basis for the federal 
monopoly on foreign policy but limiting its application.  Part VI 
concludes this Note with observations on the legal basis for the 
federal governmentís authority to conduct foreign policy and the 
future of state activity in the international arena. 
II. THREE THEORIES ON THE SOURCE OF THE FEDERAL  
MONOPOLY ON FOREIGN POLICY 
A. The Dormant Federal Foreign Affairs Power 
Under the theory of the dormant federal foreign affairs 
power, one of the three prevailing theories on the source of the 
federal monopoly on foreign policy, any state law that has a 
direct impact on the federal governmentís ability to conduct 
foreign policy is invalid.12  The dormant federal foreign affairs 
power has its roots in several Supreme Court cases from the 
early to mid-twentieth century.  In United States v. Curtiss-
Wright Export Corp., the Supreme Court upheld a joint resolution 
of Congress giving power to the President to outlaw the sale of 
arms to combatants embroiled in a conflict in Bolivia and 
Paraguay.13  Justice Sutherland, writing for the majority, said, 
ì[t]he broad statement that the federal government can exercise 
no powers except those specifically enumerated in the 
Constitution, and such implied powers as are necessary and 
proper to carry into effect the enumerated powers, is 
categorically true only in respect of our internal affairs.î14  He 
went on to explain that in his view, ìthe states severally never 
possessed international powers,î and that this power originated 
 
 11 The term ìpreemptionî is often used, and not incorrectly, to describe all three 
doctrines.  The dormant foreign affairs power and the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause 
are forms of field preemption; the federal government having intended to occupy the 
entire field of foreign affairs under these doctrines.  The direct preemption theory 
envisions instances of conflict preemption, both explicit and implied.  This note attempts 
to avoid confusion by using ìpreemptionî to refer only to such conflict preemption. 
 12 Swaine, Negotiating Federalism, supra note 10, at 1144. 
 13 299 U.S. 304, 329 (1936). 
 14 Id. at 315-16. 
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in the states acting as a union.15  Therefore, ì[a]s a member of 
the family of nations, the right and power of the United States in 
that field are equal to the right and power of the other members 
of the international family.  Otherwise, the United States is not 
completely sovereign.î16  In other words, there was no room for 
state action. 
A few years later, in Hines v. Davidowitz, the Supreme Court 
struck down a Pennsylvania law that provided for the 
registration of immigrants within the state.17  In doing so the 
Court said, ì[t]he Federal Government, representing as it does 
the collective interests of the [then] forty-eight states, is 
entrusted with full and exclusive responsibility for the conduct of 
affairs with foreign sovereignties.î18  Furthermore, the Court 
stated, ìfor national purposes, embracing our relations with 
foreign nations, we are but one people, one nation, one power.î19 
The federal foreign affairs power doctrine crystallized, 
however, during the height of the Cold War.  In Banco Nacional 
de Cuba v. Sabbatino, the Court, in ruling that the Cuban 
government had standing to sue in United States courts, 
integrated international law into federal common law. 20  The 
Court reasoned that the ìconcern for uniformity in this countryís 
dealings with foreign nationsî that is manifested in various 
clauses of the Constitution indicated ìa desire to give matters of 
international significance to the jurisdiction of federal 
institutions.î21  Therefore, it would be inappropriate for a federal 
court to apply state common law to an issue implicating 
international law. 
Sabbatino paved the way for Zschernig v. Miller four years 
later, in which perhaps the most direct embodiment of the 
dormant foreign affairs power appears.22  In Zschernig, the 
Supreme Court struck down an Oregon law prohibiting a citizen 
of a foreign country from claiming an inheritance from a resident 
of Oregon unless certain conditions were met.23  These conditions 
were meant to ensure the existence of reciprocity in inheritance 
rights between the United States and other nations and required 
foreign nationals to prove that this reciprocity existed.24  
 
 15 Id. at 316. 
 16 Id. at 318. 
 17 312 U.S. 52, 73-74 (1941). 
 18 Id. at 63. 
 19 Id. (quoting The Chinese Exclusion Cases, 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889)). 
 20 376 U.S. 398, 426-27 (1964). 
 21 Id. at 427 n.25. 
 22 389 U.S. 429, 441 (1968); Swaine, Negotiating Federalism, supra note 10, at 1143. 
 23 389 U.S. at 441. 
 24 Id. at 430-31. 
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Furthermore, the law required foreign nationals to demonstrate 
that they could take property from an Oregon estate ìwithout 
confiscation.î25 
Although the law as written applied to all nations, the Court 
found that in implementing it, probate judges regularly 
disfavored citizens of Communist countries.26  They went beyond 
simply determining whether reciprocity existed and sought ìto 
ascertain whether ërightsí protected by foreign law are the same 
ërightsí that citizens of Oregon enjoy.î27  If a right in question 
implicated a Communist-controlled state agency, then judges 
ruled that the right was not the same and that there was no 
reciprocity.28  Most troubling for the Supreme Court was the 
reference in the Oregon law to ìconfiscation,î which ìled into 
minute inquiries concerning the actual administration of foreign 
law, into the credibility of foreign diplomatic statements,î and 
into speculation as to whether inherited goods were actually 
delivered to the rightful heirs.29 
This level of involvement was too much for the Court even 
though no treaty or federal law addressed the issue.  Justice 
Douglas, writing for the majority, stated that ìeven in absence of 
a treaty, a Stateís policy may disturb foreign relations.î30  The 
Oregon law had ìa direct impact upon foreign relationsî and 
negatively affected the federal governmentís ability to conduct 
foreign policy.31  By contrast, the Supreme Court upheld a 
similar reciprocity agreement in California, which relied on the 
statement of foreign ambassadors to prove reciprocity, because it 
only had ìsome incidental or indirect effect in foreign 
countries.î32 
A major criticism of the decision in Zschernig is that the 
Court lacked direct support for its statements, relying on dicta 
from Curtiss-Wright and Hines.33  Because of this and because of 
the focus on Communist countries, the tendency has been to 
relegate Zschernig to the status of Cold War relic.34  Today, few 
adhere fully to the reasoning of Curtiss-Wright, and, without 
express language in the Constitution, a treaty, or federal statute, 
the Court has been reluctant to confer power to the federal 
 
 25 Id. 
 26 Id. at 440. 
 27 Id. 
 28 Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 440. 
 29 Id. at 435. 
 30 Id. at 441. 
 31 Id. 
 32 Id. at 433 (quoting Clark v. Allen, 311 U.S. 503, 517 (1947)). 
 33 Swaine, Negotiating Federalism, supra note 10, at 1142-43. 
 34 Id. at 1145. 
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government at the expense of the states.35  However, in light of 
the heightened tensions of the time, the Zschernig decision made 
sense.  The Oregon law struck down in Zschernig did have the 
potential to spark an international incident, and the Courtís 
expression of the dormant foreign affairs poweróthat a state law 
ìwith a direct impact upon foreign relationsî was 
unconstitutionalóreflected this reality.36 
Despite the lack of direct support in the Constitution for a 
federal monopoly on foreign policy, proponents of the dormant 
foreign affairs power can point to numerous constitutional 
provisions for substantiation.37  Article I, Section 8 gives 
Congress power ì[t]o regulate commerce with foreign nations. . . ; 
[t]o define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the 
High Seas, and Offenses against the Law of Nations;î and ì[t]o 
declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make 
Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water.î38  Article II, 
Section 2 makes the President ìCommander in Chief of the Army 
and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several 
States;î and gives him the power to make treaties and appoint 
ambassadors, and to receive ambassadors.39  Furthermore, the 
Supremacy Clause, located at Article VI, Section 4, states, ì[t]his 
Constitution, and the Laws of the United States . . . and all 
Treaties made . . . under the Authority of the United States, shall 
be the supreme Law of the Land. . . .î40  Finally, Article I, Section 
10 bars the states from entering into any ìtreaty, alliance, or 
confederation.î41  Still, critics point out that while these 
provisions give the federal government broad power over foreign 
policy, it is far from clear that they impart exclusive power.42 
The only other arguments available to advocates of the 
dormant foreign affairs power are historical and pragmatic 
ones.43  During the Articles of Confederation period, the 
independent actions of several states led to disastrous results, 
including the disruption of much-needed trade with Great 
Britain.44  The writings of Alexander Hamilton and James 
Madison in The Federalist Papers are often cited to support the 
proposition that the federal government needs unfettered control 
 
 35 Id. at 1142, 1150. 
 36 Peter J. Spiro, Foreign Relations Federalism, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1223, 1241-42 
(1999). 
 37 Chiang, supra note 8, at 933. 
 38 U.S. CONST. art I, ß 8. 
 39 U.S. CONST. art II, ßß 2-3. 
 40 U.S. CONST. art VI, ß 4. 
 41 U.S. CONST. art I, ß 10. 
 42 Swaine, Negotiating Federalism, supra note 10, at 1135. 
 43 Id. 
 44 Chiang, supra note 8, at 938. 
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over the foreign affairs of the nation.45  Hamilton wrote, ìThe 
interfering and unneighborly regulations of some States, 
contrary to the true spirit of the Union, have, in different 
instances, given just cause of umbrage and complaint to [other 
nations],î and that these regulations needed to be restrained by a 
ìnational controlî or else they ìwould be multiplied and extended 
till they became not less serious sources of animosity and discord 
than injurious impediments to the intercourse between the 
different parts of the Confederacy.î46  In addition, Madison wrote, 
ìIf we are to be one nation in any respect, it clearly ought to be in 
respect to other nations.î47  Many have argued that this danger 
has not diminished over time.  To permit the states to conduct 
their own foreign policies would be to invite chaos, since the 
actions of one state could disrupt foreign relations for the whole 
nation.48 
Critics, however, argue that increased globalization has 
given the states much greater direct access to the world at large 
and that foreign entities understand that a single state does not 
always speak for the whole nation.49  They point out that 
individual states have always involved themselves in 
international matters to some extent.  They ìestablish offices 
overseas, launch trade and investment missions, sign bilateral 
and multilateral agreements, and participate in international 
summits.î50  Denying the individual states any voice in foreign 
policy therefore runs contrary to the realities of a global 
marketplace. 
Since the Zschernig decision the Supreme Court has not 
applied the direct impact doctrine, leaving its value as precedent 
in some doubt.51  However, the Court also has never overruled 
Zschernig, and many lower courts have embraced the ìdirect 
impactî test it propounds.52  For example, in Deutsch v. Turner 
Corp., the Ninth Circuit applied the Zschernig ìdirect impactî 
test to a California law aimed at corporations who employed 
slave labor in Europe and Asia prior to and during World War 
II.53  The law was enacted at the same time as the HVIRA and 
allowed victims of slave labor to sue for compensation for the 
 
 45 Id. at 936-37. 
 46 THE FEDERALIST No. 22, at 144-45 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter, ed., 
1961). 
 47 THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 264 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter, ed., 1961). 
 48 Chiang, supra note 8, at 957. 
 49 Id. at 956. 
 50 Swaine, Negotiating Federalism, supra note 10, at 1130. 
 51 Id. at 1145. 
 52 Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs, and Federalism, 83 VA. L. 
REV. 1617, 1632 (1997). 
 53 324 F.3d 692, 709 (9th Cir. 2003). 
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work they were forced to do.54  The court invalidated the 
California law because, in its estimation, the federal government 
had exclusive power in foreign policy, especially concerning the 
ability to wage war and to negotiate an end to war.55  The court 
stated that ìthe Supreme Court has long viewed the foreign 
affairs powers specified in the text of the Constitution as 
reflections of a generally applicable constitutional principle that 
power over foreign affairs is reserved to the federal 
government.î56  Because so many lower courts have adopted the 
ìdirect impactî rule, it would seem appropriate for the Supreme 
Court to flesh out the doctrine, but so far the Court has refused 
to do so. 
B. The Dormant Foreign Commerce Clause 
The dormant Foreign Commerce Clause doctrine derives its 
legitimacy from the Interstate Commerce Clause in Article II, 
Section 8 of the Constitution, which gives Congress the power to 
regulate commerce both among the states and with foreign 
nations, and from the Import-Export Clause in Article II, Section 
10, which prohibits states from laying duties on imports or 
exports without congressional consent.57  The rationale of the 
doctrine is identical to that of the dormant Commerce Clause 
doctrine.58  A state action is invalid if it intrudes into the field of 
foreign commerce, even if Congress has not yet chosen to 
regulate a particular matter in that area. 
Japan Line Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, a case in which the 
Supreme Court overturned a tax imposed by California on 
foreign-owned cargo containers in California ports, set out the 
test for whether a state law violates the dormant Foreign 
Commerce Clause.59  According to Japan Line, if the state law in 
question prevents the federal government from ìspeak[ing] with 
one voice,î it is unconstitutional.60 
The Supreme Court further developed the ìone voiceî 
standard in Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Board.61  In 
Barclays Bank, several multinational corporations filed suit 
alleging that the worldwide combined reporting method 
employed by the State of California to calculate corporate 
 
 54 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE ß 354.6 (Deering Supp. 2003). 
 55 Deutsch, 324 F.3d at 711. 
 56 Id. at 709. 
 57 Swaine, Negotiating Federalism, supra note 10, at 1146-48. 
 58 Id. at 1146. 
 59 441 U.S. 434, 453-54 (1979). 
 60 Id. at 449. 
 61 512 U.S. 298 (1994). 
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franchise taxes unfairly taxed foreign-based multinational 
corporations twice.62  The corporations claimed that the world-
wide combined reporting method violated the Commerce Clause 
and the Due Process Clause.63  Justice Ginsburg, writing for the 
majority, dismissed most of the corporationsí claims because the 
world wide combined reporting method was ìproper and fair.î64  
Furthermore, the worldwide combined reporting method did not 
ìinevitablyî lead to double taxation, and other methods of 
calculating corporate taxes were just as susceptible to the 
dangers of double taxation.65 
The Supreme Courtís inquiry did not end there, however.  In 
light of Japan Line, the Court investigated whether Californiaís 
method impaired the federal governmentís ìcapacity to speak 
with one voice when regulating commercial relations with foreign 
governments.î66  The Court held that Congress, while aware of 
foreign opposition to the worldwide combined reporting method, 
had chosen not to forbid the states to employ it.67  Numerous bills 
that would have prohibited use of the worldwide combined 
reporting method were defeated.68  In addition, the Senate, in 
ratifying a treaty with the United Kingdom, deleted a provision 
of the treaty that would have precluded use of the method.69  The 
Court also defended the California practice against opposition by 
the Executive Branch, discounting executive statements on the 
grounds that the Constitution conferred the power to regulate 
foreign commerce to the Legislative Branch.70  As the Court 
stated, ì[W]e leave it to Congressówhose voice, in this area, is 
the Nationísóto evaluate whether the national interest is best 
served by tax uniformity, or state autonomy.î71  Thus when 
Congress and the President differ, Congress prevails in matters 
of foreign commerce.72 
Some hailed Barclays Bank as a victory for state power to 
determine foreign policy, at least on a limited basis.  However, 
the decision still gave the ultimate power over foreign policy to a 
branch of the federal government, in this case Congress, which 
happened to have compatible views with California.73  In this 
 
 62 Id. at 302. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. at 316. 
 65 Id. at 319. 
 66 Barclays Bank, 512 U.S. at 311 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 67 Id. at 324. 
 68 Id. at 325-26. 
 69 Id. at 326-27. 
 70 Id. at 329. 
 71 Barclays Bank, 512 U.S. at 331. 
 72 Id. at 329-30. 
 73 Chiang, supra note 8, at 954. 
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way, the ìone voiceî test becomes virtually identical to the ìdirect 
impactî test under the dormant foreign affairs power theory, and 
is thus susceptible to the same criticisms.74  Very little textual 
justification exists for granting Congress such power in 
situations where positive law enactments are absent.75  
Furthermore, because Japan Line, Barclays Bank, and the other 
cases using the ìone voiceî analysis all have to do with tax issues, 
the applicability of this test may very well be limited to foreign 
tax disputes.76  At any rate, it is clear that the development of the 
dormant Foreign Commerce Clause adds yet another layer of 
complexity to the question of the federal monopoly on foreign 
policy: namely, whether the monopoly belongs to Congress, the 
President, or both.77 
C. Direct Preemption 
At the core of the direct preemption theory lies the 
Supremacy Clause, which states that the Constitution, federal 
laws, and treaties are ìthe supreme Law of the Land. . . any 
Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary 
notwithstanding.î78  Thus, ì[s]tate and local measures touching 
on foreign affairs clearly cannot be maintained in the teeth of 
enacted federal lawóincluding, at a minimum, federal statutes, 
treaties, and congressionally authorized regulations.î79  There is 
nothing controversial about this idea, which is fundamental to 
the functioning of the federal government.  A state law which 
conflicts with a federal law, either expressly or by implication, is 
unconstitutional, regardless of its subject matter.  The issue then 
is determining when a conflict occurs. 
In United States v. Pink, the Supreme Court overturned 
several New York laws directed against the Soviet Union.80  The 
laws, passed after the 1917 Revolution in Russia and the 
nationalization of the Russian insurance industry, denied the 
claims of the Soviet Union to assets of Russian insurance 
companies established in the state of New York prior to the 
Bolshevik takeover.81  However, in 1933 the United States 
officially recognized the Soviet Union, and the Soviet government 
assigned its claims to the United States for collection.82  The 
 
 74 Swaine, Negotiating Federalism, supra note 10, at 1148. 
 75 Id. at 1156. 
 76 Goldsmith, supra note 52, at 1637. 
 77 Swaine, Negotiating Federalism, supra note 10, at 1156-57. 
 78 U.S. CONST. art VI, ß 4. 
 79 Swaine, Negotiating Federalism, supra note 10, at 1141. 
 80 315 U.S. 203, 234 (1942). 
 81 Id. at 210-11. 
 82 Id. at 211. 
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United States brought suit to acquire the New York assets.83  The 
Supreme Court ruled that the agreement between the United 
States and the Soviet Union was valid and, relying on the 
Supremacy Clause, recognized the Presidentís power to negotiate 
agreements with foreign governments.84  The Court stated that 
ìinternational compacts and agreementsî have the same binding 
force on the courts as treaties, and, therefore, state actions in 
conflict with such agreements are invalid.85 
More recently, the Supreme Court applied the idea of direct 
preemption in Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council.86  In 
1996 the Commonwealth of Massachusetts adopted a law entitled 
ìAn Act Regulating State Contracts with Companies Doing 
Business with or in Burma (Myanmar)î (ìMassachusetts Actî).87  
The law prohibited state entities from doing business with 
organizations that also did business with the government of 
Myanmar and was enacted in response to the atrocious human 
rights violations of the military junta in power.88 
Three months after the Massachusetts law went into effect, 
Congress passed the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and 
Related Programs Appropriations Act (ìFederal Actî).89  Among 
other provisions, the Federal Act authorized the President to 
apply sanctions directly on the government of Myanmar.90  It also 
gave him the power to inhibit ìnew investmentî by American 
entities in Myanmar and to explore diplomatic avenues ìto bring 
democracy to and improve human rights practices and the 
quality of life in [Myanmar].î91  The motivations for the Federal 
Act were similar to those of the Massachusetts Act.92 
The National Foreign Trade Council, representing several 
business organizations adversely affected by the Massachusetts 
Act, filed suit in 1998.93  The District Court granted a permanent 
injunction against the Massachusetts Act, stating that it 
ìunconstitutionally impinged on the federal governmentís 
exclusive authority to regulate foreign affairs.î94  The First 
Circuit affirmed on the grounds that the Massachusetts Act 
 
 83 Id. at 213. 
 84 Id. at 230. 
 85 Pink, 315 U.S. at 230. 
 86 530 U.S. 363, 366 (2000). 
 87 Id. at 366-67 (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 7 ßß 22G-22M (2002)). 
 88 Crosby, 530 U.S. at 367; Chiang, supra note 8, at 928. 
 89 Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 
Pub. L. No. 104-208, ß 570, 110 Stat. 3009-166 (1996). 
 90 Crosby, 530 U.S. at 369. 
 91 Id. 
 92 See id. at 370; supra text accompanying note 88. 
 93 Crosby, 530 U.S. at 370-71. 
 94 Id. at 371 (alteration in original). 
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violated the dormant foreign affairs power, the dormant Foreign 
Commerce Clause, and was preempted by the Federal Act.95 
The Supreme Court, however, affirmed the First Circuitís 
decision solely on the preemption ground.96  Justice Souter, 
writing for the unanimous Court, stated that the Massachusetts 
Act was ìan obstacle to the accomplishment of Congressís full 
objectives under the [F]ederal Actî and that ìthe state law 
undermines the intended purpose and ënatural effectí of at least 
three provisions of the [F]ederal Act . . . .î97  In explaining the 
Courtís reasoning, he noted the difference between the two Acts.  
In many ways, the Massachusetts Act was much harsher than 
the Federal Act, and the Court feared that it would hamper the 
Presidentís ability to implement the provisions of the Federal 
Act, especially its diplomatic components.98 
Direct preemption is the least controversial of the three 
because it has clear constitutional support.  However, in limiting 
the Crosby holding to direct preemption, the court deliberately 
closed off any discussion of the dormant federal foreign affairs 
power or the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause and 
disappointed those who had hoped for some clarification of the 
meaning and continued relevance of Zschernig and Barclays 
Bank.99  This disappointment reflects the major shortcoming of 
the direct preemption approach, a shortcoming that in many 
ways spurred the Zschernig decision in the first place.  There is 
not always a federal law or treaty in direct conflict with a state 
action, but in some way, it is clear that a state action intrudes 
into the ability of the federal government to conduct foreign 
policy freely.  In such a situation, the direct preemption approach 
will not work to alleviate the problem, and the only options open 
to the courts are doctrines on which the Supreme Court has not 
commented.100 
III. AMERICAN INSURANCE ASSOCIATION V. GARAMENDI ñ A 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Factual Background 
Insurance policies and annuities were widely popular 
investments among Jews in Europe prior to the Second World 
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War.101  These policies were held by individuals from every walk 
of life and covered everything ìfrom life, property, and business 
assets to vehicles, art, and future dowries for holdersí 
daughters.î102  With the rise of the Nazi government in Germany 
and the attendant persecution of the Jews, these insurance 
policies and annuities became targets for confiscation.103  At first, 
this confiscation was indirect.  Jews were forced to cash out their 
policies in order to pay the heavy taxes levied solely upon them 
or to pay the steep emigration fees if they wanted to leave 
Germany.104  However, following the night of November 9, 1938ó
also known as Kristallnachtóon which Jewish-owned businesses 
throughout Germany were systematically looted and destroyed, 
the Nazi government convinced insurance companies to pay 
claims for damage arising out of the vandalism into the Reich 
treasury at a fraction of the value of the claims.105  It was not 
long before the German government began taking the policies of 
Jews outright, and many insurance companies have been accused 
of colluding with the Third Reich in this large-scale theft.106 
After the end of World War II, insurance companies offered a 
litany of excuses for their refusal to honor pre-war policies.  They 
pointed to ìthe destruction of company records during the 
war.î107  They cited claimantsí inability to produce death 
certificates for relatives who had died in concentration camps or 
the fact that policyholders had stopped paying premiums when 
they were deported to those camps.108  In some of the most 
blatant cases, they informed claimants that they could not pay on 
the policies because the proceeds had already been paidóto Nazi 
officials.109  Insurance companies further argued that they were 
relieved from paying on policies held in countries that became 
Communist after the war because the insurance industries in 
those countries had been nationalized.110 
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This preoccupation with the realities of the Cold War seemed 
to push the issue of reparations out of the spotlight, at least for a 
time.  With the exception of a few scattered, mostly unsuccessful 
lawsuits in Europe on behalf of Holocaust victims and survivors 
immediately following the end of the war, there was little activity 
in this area until the 1990s and the fall of the Berlin Wall.111 
In 1997, various Holocaust survivors and their heirs brought 
federal and state suits in New York and California against over a 
dozen insurance companies for their failure to pay claims.112  
Many of the insurance companies prominent in Europe before 
World War II are still prominent today and are, in fact, major 
players in the United States insurance industry, among them 
Assicurazioni Generali of Italy and Allianz of Germany.113  As a 
result of this litigation and pressure from individual state 
insurance commissioners, Generali and Allianz, along with three 
other insurance companies, several foreign governments, and a 
collection of international Jewish organizations formed the 
International Commission on Holocaust Era Insurance Claims 
(ICHEIC) in order to process the claims of Holocaust victims and 
their heirs.114 
In 1998, Congress also passed the Holocaust Assets 
Commission Act, requiring state insurance commissioners to 
investigate and create a record of insurance policies and other 
assets from the Holocaust era.115  Furthermore, an agreement 
finalized in 2000 between the German and American 
governments allows for the creation of a fund to compensate 
Holocaust victims and their heirs and provides a general promise 
to comply with the procedures established by the ICHEIC.116  The 
United States has negotiated similar agreements with Austria 
and France with respect to stolen assets of Holocaust victims.117 
These agreements, however, are not without their critics.  
Insurance companies within the ICHEIC have a significant 
amount of control over the processing of claims, resulting in 
longer delays and smaller ultimate payouts than those yielded by 
litigation.118  Additionally, early conflicts between the terms of 
the U.S.-German agreement and the procedures established by 
the ICHEIC have significantly hampered the ability of claimants 
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to receive compensation.119  Furthermore, the unwillingness of 
the German and Austrian governments to make any reparations 
as long as lawsuits are pending in American courts has also 
complicated matters.120 
Partly in response to Congressís enactment of the Holocaust 
Act, California passed the HVIRA in 1999.121  According to the 
declaration of the legislature, ì[s]urvivors are asking that 
insurance companies come forth with any information they 
possess that could show proof of insurance policies held by 
Holocaust victims and survivors, in order to ensure that closure 
on this issue is swiftly brought to pass.î122  The declaration goes 
on to say that ì[i]nsurance companies . . . have a responsibility to 
ensure that any involvement they or their related companies may 
have had with insurance policies of Holocaust victims are 
disclosed to the stateî and that the HVIRA ìis necessary to 
protect the claims and interests of California residents, as well as 
to encourage the development of a resolution to these issues 
through the international process or through direct action by the 
State of California, as necessary.î123 
The HVIRA required ì[a]ny insurer currently doing business 
in the state that sold life, property, liability, health, annuities, 
dowry, educational, or casualty insurance policies, directly or 
through a related company, to persons in Europe, which were in 
effect between 1920 and 1945î to disclose information pertaining 
to these aforementioned policies, including whether or not the 
proceeds had been paid to the designated beneficiaries.124  
Furthermore, failure on the part of an insurance company to 
comply with the provisions of the HVIRA would result in the 
suspension of that companyís authority to conduct insurance 
business in California.125 
It was not long before the HVIRA was challenged in the 
courts.  In 2000, several insurance entities brought suit arguing 
the unconstitutionality of the statute by claiming that it violated 
the federal foreign affairs power and the Foreign Commerce 
Clause of the U.S. Constitution.126  On these grounds, a federal 
district court granted a preliminary injunction against 
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enforcement of the HVIRA.127  On appeal, the Ninth Circuit 
rejected these claims but remanded the case to the district court 
for consideration of the plaintiffsí due process claims.128  The 
district court granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs on the 
grounds that the HVIRA violated the insurance companiesí due 
process rights.129  However, on appeal, the Ninth Circuit again 
reversed the district court and upheld the constitutionality of the 
HVIRA, ruling that it did not violate the foreign affairs power or 
the Commerce Clause.130 
Ultimately, though, the Supreme Court struck down the 
HVIRA in Garamendi under the theory that it was preempted by 
the express foreign policy of the federal government as embodied 
in the executive agreements with Germany, France, and Austria 
and by U.S. involvement in the ICHEIC.131 
B. The Majority Holding and its Reasoning 
In deciding that the HVIRA was unconstitutional, the 
majority focused on the significance of the executive agreements 
between the United States and Germany, Austria, and France.132  
The petitioners, the American Insurance Association and various 
other insurance entities, as well as the United States government 
and several foreign governments as amici curae, argued that the 
HVIRA conflicted with the foreign policy expressed in these 
agreements.133  The majority, favoring this argument, said 
ì[t]here is, of course, no question that at some point an exercise of 
state power that touches on foreign relations must yield to the 
National Governmentís policy . . . .î134  They cited the ìconcern for 
uniformityî that the framers of the Constitution expressed, as 
evidenced by the writings of Alexander Hamilton and James 
Madison in the Federalist Papers.135 
The majority went on to say that, generally, there is no 
question that ìthere is executive authority to decide what that 
policy should be.î136  While admitting that the support for their 
conclusion ìdoes not enjoy any textual detail,î they cited the 
Constitutionís vesting of power in the Executive Branch and 
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several cases, including Curtiss-Wright, which generally support 
the premise that there is executive authority to decide foreign 
policy.137 
More specifically, the majority considered the power of the 
President to enter into executive agreements such as the ones 
with Germany, Austria, and France.138  Citing Pink, they noted 
that, starting with George Washington, Presidents have 
negotiated executive agreements with foreign governments 
without Senate approval or congressional challenge, and that the 
practice has always been upheld by the courts.139  They also 
dismissed the notion that executive agreements concerning 
World War II-era insurance claims were less valid because they 
took aim at foreign corporations rather than foreign governments 
themselves.140  Justice Souter stated that ìuntangling 
government policy from private initiative during war time is 
often so hard that diplomatic action settling claims against 
private parties may well be just as essential in the aftermath of 
hostilities as diplomacy to settle claims against foreign 
governments.î141 
The majority thus concluded that ìvalid executive 
agreements are fit to preempt state law, just as treaties 
are . . . .î142  However, because the executive agreements did not 
contain explicit preemption clauses, in order to determine the 
actís constitutionality they were forced to examine whether the 
executive agreements truly preempted the HVIRA.143 
Continuing their inquiry, the majority turned to Zschernig.  
They noted the Courtís claim in that case that ìour system of 
government is such that . . . no less than the interest of the 
people of the whole nation, imperatively requires that federal 
power in the field affecting foreign relations be left entirely free 
from local interference.î144  This language echoes the broad 
statements of national power in Curtiss-Wright and Hines.145  
They also touched, however, on Justice Harlanís concurring 
opinion in Zschernig and his disagreement over the idea of a 
complete federal monopoly on foreign affairs, that for him a 
ìconflicting federal policyî was necessary.146 
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ìIt is a fair question,î Justice Souter wrote, ìwhether respect 
for the executive foreign relations power requires a categorical 
choice between the contrasting theories . . . evident in the 
Zschernig opinions,î but having brought up the question, Justice 
Souter declined to answer.147  He reasoned that, under either 
view, legislation ìin conflict with express foreign policy of the 
National Governmentî would be preempted.148  The majority then 
concluded that the HVIRA conflicted sufficiently with federal 
policy as to be unconstitutional because it was clear from the 
executive agreements with Germany and Austria that federal 
policy mandated working within the procedures of the 
ICHEIC.149  Citing Crosby, the majority noted that while the 
goals and motivations of the state and federal governments 
might have been similar, their approaches were not, and the 
HVIRA had the potential for frustrating the implementation of 
the federal policy by undermining the ICHEIC and annoying 
European nations.150  Regardless of which was the better 
approach, California could not be allowed to frustrate the 
Presidentís diplomacy.151 
Finally, the majority dismissed Californiaís argument, which 
paralleled those in Barclays Bank: that Congress, in passing the 
Holocaust Commission Act, condoned statutes such as the 
HVIRA; and that Congress, with its power to regulate foreign 
commerce, should control despite executive agreements to the 
contrary.152  In so doing, the majority insisted that the President 
took the ìlead roleî in foreign policy,153 and that the majorityís 
reading of the Holocaust Commission Act did not authorize 
anything in the HVIRA.154  In addition, the Court pointed out 
that Congress had not acted in disapproval of the Presidentís 
actions.155 
C. The Dissent 
Justice Ginsburg, writing for the dissent, began by stating: 
ìThe Presidentís primacy in foreign affairs . . . empowers him to 
conclude executive agreements with other countries.î156  She also 
agreed that such executive agreements have the power to 
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preclude state law.157  However, in such instances, she insisted 
that the agreements be narrowly construed.  Applying this 
reasoning, Justice Ginsburg concluded that the executive 
agreements with Germany, Austria, and France did not preclude 
the HVIRA,158 that the United Statesí involvement in the 
ICHEIC concerned the actual settlement of claims, and that the 
HVIRA merely concerned disclosureóan issue which the 
executive agreements did not address.159 
Justice Ginsburg also took issue with the majorityís reliance 
on Zschernig, saying, ìWe have not relied on Zschernig since it 
was decided, and I would not resurrect that decision here.î160  
She reasoned that Zschernig applies only to ìstate policy critical 
of foreign governments.î161  She also disagreed with the 
application of Pink and Crosby.  In Crosby a federal statute was 
implicated, not merely an executive agreement, and while an 
executive agreement was at issue in Pink, it spoke directly 
against the activity of the state of New York.162  In addition, she 
dismissed the statements of executive officials against the 
HVIRA, noting that similar statements of opinion were not 
controlling in Barclays Bank.163  Justice Ginsburg felt that by 
giving weight to such statements and by inferring preclusion 
from the stated goals of the executive agreements, the Court was 
overstepping its bounds.164  She concluded by saying, ìjudges 
should not be the expositors of the Nationís foreign policy, which 
is the role they play by acting when the President himself has not 
taken a clear stand.î165 
IV. STRETCHING DIRECT PREEMPTION TO ITS BREAKING POINT ñ 
PROBLEMS WITH THE REASONING OF GARAMENDI 
It is evident from both the majority and the dissenting 
opinions in Garamendi that the Supreme Court favors the direct 
preemption theory of federal supremacy in the realm of foreign 
affairs.  The majority, while seeming to pay homage to the 
dormant federal foreign affairs power theory in Zschernig, 
ultimately did not apply it, and the dissent was openly hostile to 
the idea.166  Likewise, the majority dismissed the dormant 
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Foreign Commerce Clause argument formulated in Barclays 
Bank, noting that, in foreign policy, the President and not 
Congress has the ìlead role.î167  The dissent did not even address 
the issue, despite the fact that the Ninth Circuit decision was 
based on the theory enumerated in Barclays Bank.168 
However, the Courtís reliance in Garamendi on direct 
preemption raises an issue: What is ìexpress foreign policy?î  
Normally, this question is not so hard to answer.  ìNo one 
disputes that properly enacted treaties, statutes, and executive 
acts have preemptive authority; as long as someone makes clear 
what the law is, supremacy usually takes care of itself.î169  In 
other words, the Supremacy Clause can easily be invoked if there 
is a federal statute or treaty on point or an executive agreement 
with a clear statement of its purpose and effect.  As evidenced by 
the deep division amongst the Justices in the Garamendi 
decision, it is, however, questionable whether the Court had 
before it such a clear statement of foreign policy. 
When the courts look to something less authoritative than a 
federal statute or treaty or a precisely stated executive 
agreementóexecutive pronouncements, amici briefs, or even 
mere silenceóto make a case for direct preemption, three 
problems occur.  First, the courts risk, as Justice Ginsburg 
cautioned in Garamendi, overstepping their bounds.170  As stated 
in the unanimous Crosby opinion, the details of foreign policy 
belong to Congress and the President.171  Moreover, ìthe 
Constitution does not make the judiciary the overseer of our 
government.î172  Simply stated, the judicial branch is not 
equipped to determine controversies related to foreign policy 
based upon anything other than explicit statements of such 
foreign policy from the other branches. 
Second, in relying on documents such as congressional 
reports, debate transcripts, amici briefs, and failed legislation, or 
on silence for preemptive statements of foreign policy, the courts 
allow Congress and the President to exceed their constitutional 
powers.173  In Barclays Bank, the Supreme Court ruled that 
Congressí acquiescence to Californiaís employment of the 
worldwide combined reporting accounting method was enough of 
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a foreign policy statement to sanction Californiaís actions.174  In 
Garamendi, Congressí silence was interpreted as support for the 
Presidentís actions in making executive agreements with 
Germany, Austria, and France and for the United Statesí 
involvement in the ICHEIC.175  Given that the powers conferred 
to the federal government in Articles I and II of the Constitution 
are affirmative powers, there is little constitutional justification 
for this practice. 
Third, in looking beyond positive executive or congressional 
statements to make a case for direct preemption, the Supreme 
Court has initiated something of a ìturf warî between Congress 
and the President over which is the ìone voiceî of foreign policy.  
Under the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause theory espoused in 
Barclays Bank, the speaker is clearly Congress, and the Ninth 
Circuitís decision relied on this Supreme Court determination.176  
In concluding that the HVIRA did not violate the dormant 
foreign affairs power or the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause, 
the Ninth Circuit stated, ìOn the basis of the text, context, and 
history of the Holocaust Act, we conclude that Congress was 
aware of the statesí involvement in this area and, at least 
implicitly, encouraged laws like HVIRA.î177  The decision in 
Garamendi flew in the face of this statement.  Despite the fact 
that the sale of insurance clearly implicates foreign commerce, 
the Supreme Court (whoís composition was virtually the same as 
in Barclays Bank) dismissed the dormant Foreign Commerce 
Clause argument and handed the reigns of foreign policy back to 
the President.178  Such inconsistency undermines the ability of 
the court to provide the lower courts and the states with a 
workable rule. 
V. VINDICATING ZSCHERNIG ñ A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF 
THE FEDERAL MONOPOLY ON FOREIGN POLICY AND ITS 
APPLICATION TO GARAMENDI 
Given the apparent failure of the direct preemption theory in 
the absence of a federal law or treaty or a clear statement of 
policy, a workable rule is desperately needed to provide 
consistent direction to the lower courts.  Despite the Supreme 
Courtís seeming disdain for Zschernig, that case may very well 
provide the solution.  After all, even a vague rule is better than 
no rule at all.  By abandoning the precedent set in Zschernig, the 
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Supreme Court has left lower courts to fend for themselves, 
resulting in ìany number of tests rules [sic] and standards.î179 
In addition, though there is little constitutional support for a 
broad foreign affairs power, it is not completely without 
constitutional basis.180  Given the demonstrated practicality of 
having a unified foreign policy, it seems prudent to have a 
mechanism for curtailing state activity. 
Moreover, while Congress or the President could preempt a 
state law at any time through a positive pronouncement, the 
damage to foreign relations is often already done.  Applying a 
dormant foreign affairs test allows the judiciary to more 
efficiently curtail the damaging activity, especially in potentially 
inflammatory situations.181  One of the criticisms of Zschernig is 
that its reasoning seems to be based upon a uniquely Cold War 
mentality and that it is simply no longer applicable to todayís 
world.182  Legal scholars have argued that increasing 
globalization has blurred, and in some cases erased, the line 
between strictly local and foreign affairs, and that the end of the 
Cold War has made foreign retaliation for state actions less likely 
and judicial intervention less necessary.183  However, the events 
of recent years have shown how quickly the world can change.  
Those who shrug off Zschernig as nothing more than a relic of a 
tense, paranoid time in our national history do so at their own 
peril. 
Granted, the danger in applying the Zschernig ìdirect 
impactî testóthat the courts will overstep their authorityóstill 
exists.  As laid out, the outcome of a Zschernig analysis ìturns on 
a courtís independent assessment of its foreign relations 
implications.î184  However, adding two more layers to the 
analysis would diminish this danger greatly.  First, when looking 
for a ìdirect impact,î courts should focus not on any specific 
foreign policy that Congress or the President has chosen but 
rather on the powers contained in Articles I and II of the 
Constitution.  For instance, the Court should ask whether the 
state action in question would have a direct impact on the federal 
governmentís ability to regulate foreign commerce or to wage 
war.  Doing so removes the Courtís focus from the meaning of 
congressional silence or the implications of low-level executive 
statements and places that focus on the area of greatest judicial 
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competenceóinterpreting the provisions of the federal 
Constitution.  Second, the court should only strike down a state 
law under the Zschernig test when the danger of leaving it intact 
is greater.  Such a requirement gives deference to the legislative 
and executive branches while allowing for swift action when 
necessary. 
As previously mentioned, the Ninth Circuit in Deutsch v. 
Turner Corp. applied something similar to this modified 
Zschernig test to the California law in question in that case.185  
In applying Zschernig, it backed off from the sweeping 
statements of federal power found in Pink.186  Further 
examination reveals that the court based this exclusive power on 
several of the enumerated powers concerning the conduct of war 
found in Articles I and II of the Constitution, and not on some 
vague general notion of federal foreign affairs power.187  The 
court noted that the California law, because it implicated the 
ability of the United States to negotiate the end of hostilities as 
World War II drew to a close, was provocative by its nature and 
would be dangerous if allowed to stand.188 
Using Deutsch v. Turner Corp. as a model for a Zschernig 
analysis of the HVIRA, the Court should first look at the specific 
bases for federal power which come into play.  For instance, 
Congress has the ability to regulate foreign commerce, and 
ìstatutes that ëmainly involve foreign commerceí are among those 
least likely to be held invalid under the foreign affairs power.î189  
Several states also filed a joint amicus brief in support of the 
HVIRA in Garamendi in which they explained that insurance is 
clearly a matter of commerce governed by Congress and that, 
ìCongress was aware of the state activities in question . . . .  
Congress has not acted to stop those state efforts.  To the 
contrary, Congressóthrough the U.S. Holocaust Assets 
Commission Act of 1998, and congressional statementsóhas 
encouraged the States to continue their efforts.î190  In addition, 
the states argued that HVIRA has only an incidental effect on 
foreign policy.  They said, ì[t]he HVIRA is directed to 
corporations, not governments.  It does not turn upon the policies 
or structures of foreign governments.  Moreover, its application is 
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not only evenhanded, but is also ministerial.î191  Furthermore, 
the Court in Deutsch argued that the ìHVIRA does not attempt 
to hold defendants liable for their past wartime conduct; it 
therefore does not implicate the exclusive power of the federal 
government to make and resolve war.î192  If these assertions are 
true, then the HVIRA does not meet the ìdirect impactî test. 
On the other hand, the requirements of the HVIRA may 
come into conflict with the Presidentís ability to negotiate with 
other nations as bestowed by the Treaty Power.  The United 
Statesí amicus brief filed in support of the petitioner insurance 
entities in Garamendi said, ìHVIRA has generated the very 
tensions in international relations that the United States has 
sought to avoid, prompting protests from the governments of 
Germany and Switzerland concerning HVIRAís application to 
insurance policies written in those countries.î193  Furthermore, 
the brief cautioned: 
State government officials, who are not part of the process 
through which the Nation formulates and conducts its 
international relations, are not well positioned to evaluate 
what adverse impact their actions may have for those 
relations.  They cannot, for example, be expected to make an 
informed assessment of whether, or how, or when a foreign 
government might respond to provocative state legislation, or 
how detrimental the response might be to various important 
interests of the United States as a whole.194 
In addition, many of the prohibitions on the states in the 
Constitution can be viewed as aimed at preventing war, and in 
this light, any provocative state action flies in the face of these 
prohibitions and conflicts with the federal governmentís War 
Powers.195  The government of Germany, in its amicus brief filed 
in opposition to the HVIRA, stated that ìthe HVIRA offends 
German and U.S. sovereignty.  Californiaís law is particularly 
offensive to Germany in light of the lawís clear implication that 
the Federal Republic is either incapable or unwilling to achieve 
the proper resolution of unpaid Holocaust-era insurance 
claims.î196  Clearly the German government regards the HVIRA 
as a provocative state action causing tension in U.S.-German 
relations and implicating the federal governmentís War Powers.  
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Therefore, a strong case exists that the HVIRA has a ìdirect 
impactî on the power of the federal government to conduct 
foreign policy. 
If the Court were to determine that the HVIRA had a ìdirect 
impactî on the federal governmentís ability to conduct foreign 
policy based upon the statuteís implication of the Treaty Power 
and the War Powers, then the Court should continue the analysis 
by looking at the relative danger of allowing the HVIRA to stand.  
For example, the United Statesí amicus brief stated, ìIt is not for 
respondents to trivialize the potential implications of [foreign 
governmentsí] protests for United States foreign policy, especially 
at a time of international tension when relations between this 
Nation and its European allies are at their most sensitive.î197  
Given the great desire to avoid harming the United Statesí 
relationships with its European allies any further and the 
importance of those relationships, the Court could deem the 
danger great enough to invalidate the HVIRA without resorting 
to the tortured application of the direct preemption theory found 
in Garamendi. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
It is clear from history and from the enumerated powers 
found in Article I and II of the Constitution that the federal 
government has substantial power to conduct foreign policy.  
While the rationale for a complete federal monopoly on foreign 
policy lacks substantial support, the Supreme Court acts on 
equally shaky ground in rejecting Zschernig and stretching the 
idea of direct preemption to its breaking point to strike down 
state laws that interfere with the federal governmentís ability to 
conduct foreign policy. 
The decision in Garamendi illustrates the shortcomings of 
the direct preemption approach.  In the absence of a federal law, 
treaty, or other official pronouncement, the Court is forced to 
look at other, less official sources for preemptive language, a 
practice which does nothing to diminish the danger of the 
judiciary interfering in the foreign policy prerogative of Congress 
or the President.  In addition, by being inconsistent as to whether 
the Congress or the President has the final word on foreign policy 
determinations, the Supreme Court has left lower courts and 
state governments without guidance. 
The Zschernig test is not so vague that it cannot be applied.  
Deutsch v. Turner Corp. illustrates such an analysis, and with 
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additional safeguardsónarrowly construing the powers of the 
federal government and weighing the danger of allowing the law 
in question to standóthe Zschernig test could easily have been 
applied to the HVIRA. 
 
